A typical hedge fund manager receives greater compensation when the fund has a strong absolute or relative performance. Asymmetric performance fees and fund flow-performance relationship may create incentives for risk-shifting, estimated in our study by the change in fund return volatility in...

This paper tests for contagion in emerging debt markets following Russia and Argentina's government defaults. Using techniques that have been previously suggested for contagion tests in stock markets we find that debt and stock markets respond differently to financial crises. Volatilities and...

Hedged mutual funds proliferated following the 2007-2009 financial crisis. They became particularly popular with financial advisors because of their alleged downside protection. Did these funds deliver what they promised? We examine the performance of these funds with a focus on the post-2009...

Hedge fund performance and risk measurement continues to present intriguing challenges to both academics and practitioners. Risk-return measures that are solely based on historical return series tend to provide limited information and the marginal new information revealed by another quantitative...

The hedge funds industry has evolved tremendously in recent years. According to the CASAM CISDM Industry Report, assets under management in hedge funds had grown from less than USD 50 billion at the end of 1990 to over USD 2.1 trillion at the end of 2007. However, assets managed by hedge funds...

Hedge fund managers with asymmetric performance-based compensation packages have the incentive to increase the risk taking of their funds in response to poor performance. Based on regression analysis of data from a panel of dollar-based hedge funds from 1994-2008, we find evidence that they do...