We study a repeated Nash demand game, where bargainers follow a fictitious play procedure after their one-shot decision on demand in the initial period. In the reduced static game they play at the initial period, all the epsilon-equilibria are clustered around the division corresponding to the...

We show that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property. We also show that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game.

We study two bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedures with complete information and endogenous agenda, where each issue is associated with a finite set of alternatives. In both procedures, when bargaining frictions are small, we find a large multiplicity of equilibrium agreements, including...

We compare bargaining solutions in terms of the relevance of alternatives. We show that most well-known bargaining solutions do not use all the alternatives, but there are numerous bargaining solutions that do. We introduce a new class of bargaining solutions called ``average alternative...