CEO incentives to mitigate the risk-shifting incentives of firm managers …This paper investigates whether monitoring by bank lenders affects CEO incentives of borrowing firms. We find that an … increase in bank monitoring incentives significantly reduce the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega …

evaluates that literature, clarifies what tournament theory predicts about the relationship, identifies methodological pitfalls … relationship between pay disparity and firm performance. Tournament theory offers a unified framework that can explain an inverted …

We find that managers receive more risk-taking incentives in their compensation packages once their firms are …

This study examines the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating managerial risk-taking incentives into their … credit risk evaluation. We measure risk-taking incentives using two proxies: the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock … impound managerial risk-taking incentives in their credit risk assessments. Assuming other things equal, a one standard …

incentives: pay-performance elasticity (PPE), semi-elasticity (PPSE), and sensitivity (PPS). Larger, more R&D intensive, and low …, suggesting that the average firm's incentives are at the low end of the optimal range. Overall, the results obtained with the PPE …

's core business and explorative inventions. It implies that managers diversify their innovation portfolios and decrease …

%. The Pay Gap between the CEO and its subordinate executives (tournament incentives) also plays a major role in lowering IPO … failure risk. The effectiveness of CEO pay is strengthened among well-governed firms, whereas tournament incentives are …

obtain high-powered incentives and, hence, a high personal income at the merger-management stage. …