This article integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an optimal contracting framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm's debt capacity while increasing its incentives to...

We present a positive theory of capital market frictions that raise the cost of capital for new firms and lower the cost of capital for incumbent firms. Capital market frictions arise from a political conflict across voters who differ in two dimensions: (i) a fraction of voters owns capital, the...

type="main" xml:lang="en" <p>Securitization is a process that transforms some traditional non-traded banking assets into marketable securities. To evaluate this process, this paper surveys theories of the intertemporal allocation of funds through demand deposits and anonymous markets, first...</p>

The article re-examines the proposition, first formulated by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybcvig ( 1983), that in a production economy with stochastic liquidity shocks to the household sector, banks serve to provide optimal intertemporal insurance to consumers. The paper argues that in order...

This paper studies optimal financial contracts and product market competition under a strategic transparency decision. When firms seeking outside finance resort to actively monitored debt in order to commit against opportunistic behaviour, the dominant lender can influence corporate...

This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an incomplete contract framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm's debt capacity while increasing its incentives to default...

This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bankruptcy rules into a theory of optimal debt structure. We show that, in an incomplete-contracts framework with imperfect renegotiation, having multiple creditors increases a firm's debt capacity while increasing its incentives to...

Legislation affects corporate governance and the return to human and financial capital. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of labor rents. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human...

This article proposes a theory of corporate transparency and its determinants. We show that under imperfect product market competition, the corporate transparency decision affects the value of equity and debt claims differently. We then embed this insight in a model of endogenous investor...

This paper develops an infinite-horizon model of financial institutions that borrow short-term and invest in long-term assets that can be traded in frictionless markets. Because these financial intermediaries perform maturity transformation, they are subject to potential runs. We derive distinct...