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CEO Accountability for Corporate Fraud : Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China
Chen, Jiandong - 2014
of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure … Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares that could not be traded. This restriction mitigated state …-owned enterprise controlling shareholders' incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067702
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CEO Accountability for Corporate Fraud : Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China
Chen, Jiandong - 2016
of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure … Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares that could not be traded. This restriction mitigated state …-owned enterprise controlling shareholders' incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008262
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Cross-listing, managerial compensation and corporate governance
Luo, Yongli - In: Cogent economics & finance 2 (2014) 1, pp. 1-17
employed as a way of asset appropriation at the managers' discretion. The results also confirm that corporate governance is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490450
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CEO Power, Ownership Structure and Pay Performance in Chinese Banking
Luo, Yongli - 2015
This paper examines the determinants of executive compensation in Chinese banking during 2005-2012. Using the fixed effects panel, 2SLS and dynamic GMM regressions, I find that there is no significant positive pay performance relation, and CEO power does not necessarily exhibit higher levels of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024202
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Management compensation and corporate governance reform in China
Luo, Yongli - 2022
This paper investigates the effect of split-share structure reform on the dynamics between executive compensation and …-share structure reform has positive impacts on management compensation and firm performance. The reform results in significant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013406881
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Power, rent extraction, and executive compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian; Fried, Jesse - In: CESifo Forum 03 (2002) 3, pp. 23-28
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695703
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What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation?
Cole, Rebel A. (contributor); Mehran, Hamid (contributor) - 2008
This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of privately held U.S. corporations. We find that (i) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003781452
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Competing with superstars
Ammann, Manuel; Horsch, Philipp; Oesch, David - 2015
This paper investigates the effect of superstar CEOs on their competitors. Exploiting shocks to CEO status due to prestigious media awards, we document a significant positive stock market performance of competitors of superstar CEOs subsequent to the award. The effect is more pronounced for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011344197
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Executive compensation structure and credit spreads
Colonnello, Stefano; Curatola, Giuliano; Hoang, Ngoc Giang - 2014
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010374423
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Executive compensation, macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow cyclicality
Colonnello, Stefano - 2016
I model the joint effects of debt, macroeconomic conditions, and cash flow cyclicality on risk-shifting behavior and managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. I show that risk-shifting incentives rise during recessions and that the shareholders can eliminate such adverse incentives by reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011445657