We gather data from 77 current mid-level managers and 111 future entry-level managers, to investigate how they value stock options and restricted stock. We refer to our current and future manager groups collectively as quot;managers.quot; We supplement our manager data with a dozen field...

We conduct a field survey to investigate whether current mid-level and future entry-level managers (collectively managers) subjectively value stock options and restricted stock consistent with economic theory. We find that managers, on average, subjectively value stock options at greater than...

We investigate whether managers “hide” bad news by announcing earnings during periods of low attention, or by providing less forewarning of an upcoming earnings announcement. Our findings are consistent with managers reporting bad news after market hours, on busy days, and with less advance...

This Internet Appendix includes supplementary discussion and analyses. The original paper "Market (in)attention and the strategic scheduling and timing of earnings announcements" is available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2545966" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2545966