Using voting data from the Bank of England, we show that different individual assessments of the economy strongly influence votes after controlling for individual policy preferences. We estimate that internal members form more precise assessments than externals and are also more hawkish, though...

Using voting data from the Bank of England, we show that different individual assessments of the economy strongly influence votes after controlling for individual policy preferences. We estimate that internal members form more precise assessments than externals and are also more hawkish, though...

This paper considers the performance of average inflation targeting (AIT) policy in a New Keynesian model with adaptive learning agents. Our analysis raises concerns regarding robustness of AIT when agents have imperfect knowledge. In particular, the target steady state can be locally unstable...

We characterize optimal monetary policy when agents are learning about endogenous asset prices. Boundedly rational expectations induce inefficient equilibrium asset price fluctuations which translate into inefficient aggregate demand fluctuations. We find that the optimal policy raises interest...

We argue that it is not necessary for the central bank to react to the exchange rate to have a desirable outcome in the economy. Indeed, when the Taylor rule includes contemporane-ous data on the variables in the rule, the central bank can disregard from the exchange rate as long as there is...