This paper analyzes company disclosures of CEO stock option values in compliance with the SEC s regulations for reporting executive compensation data to stockholders. Companies appear to exploit the flexibility of the regulations to reduce the apparent value of managerial compensation. Companies...

We investigate whether convertibility provisions and restrictive covenants operate as substitute methods for reducing agency costs of debt. In a study of the 192 recent debt issues, we find that an issuer s investment opportunities are negatively related to the presence of covenants and...

We test the prediction that leverage is inversely associated with managerial entrenchment. We examine leverage levels and year-to-year changes for several hundred firms between 1984 and 1991. We find that leverage levels are positively related to CEO stock ownership and CEO stock option...

This paper analyzes company disclosures of CEO stock option values in compliance with the SEC s regulations for reporting executive compensation data to stockholders. Companies appear to exploit the flexibility of the regulations to reduce the apparent value of managerial compensation. Companies...

We test the hypothesis that corporate managers leave their jobs less often when they receive stock-based compensation. In a sample of CEOs from 452 U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991, we find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the amount of stock option...

We investigate a puzzling empirical regularity: the near-total absence of restrictive covenants from convertible bonds issued by U.S. companies. In a study of 192 recent debt issues, we find that an issuer s investment opportunities are negatively related to the presence of covenants and...

We study contracts negotiated between professional baseball players and teams to investigate the use of real options in a commercial setting. Baseball contracts feature options in diverse forms, and we find that these options have significant effects on player compensation. As predicted by...

An examination of CEO compensation and turnover in 452 large U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991 provides evidence that compensation policies play a significant role in retaining the services of top managers. We find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the amount by...

We find that executives sell shares of previously owned stock after receiving equity-based incentive compensation, counteracting boards' attempts to tie their wealth to firm value. Executives sell stock during years in which they receive new stock options or restricted stock, and some evidence...

We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and...