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In this study, I summarize the current state of executive compensation, discuss measurement and incentive issues, document recent trends in executive pay in both U.S. and international firms, and analyze the evolution of executive pay over the past century. Most recent analyses of executive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025560
The competitive target pay policy sets a target amount of total compensation within a specified range of the amount paid to executive peers. If such a policy were widely adopted by compensation committees, we would observe a negative cross-sectional association between the stock price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013403344
The competitive target pay policy sets a target dollar number for total CEO compensation within a specified range of the amounts paid to a CEO’s peers chosen from similar sized firms in the same industry. If such a policy were widely adopted by compensation committees, we would observe a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014351180
For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068058
Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of variable pay if certain triggering conditions are met. As a result of regulatory responses to financial crises and corporate scandals as well as of growing shareholder pressure to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833330
Prior literature provides compelling evidence of an asymmetric relation between executive bonus compensation and earnings performance. In particular, this literature reports that compensation committees assign greater weight to good (positive) earnings performance than poor (negative) earnings...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013143477
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949
The prevailing agency theory framework in executive compensation studies highlights the conflict of interest between … managers and shareholders. Our study extends the literature by examining the incorporation of debt-related performance metrics …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014351042
We address two apparent paradoxes of risk management: (1) managers hedge in order to avoid negative earnings surprises …, yet they tend to hedge risks uninformative of the value of the company; and (2) the presence of options in managers … informational asymmetry between insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors). Investors derive information about company value from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092522
Using hand collected data on division manager (DM) pay contracts, we document that DM pay is related to the performance of both her division and the other divisions in the firm. There is substantial heterogeneity in DM pay-for-performance. DM pay for her division's performance is lower in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905692