Banks lend more to banks that are similar to them. Using data from the German credit register and proprietary supervisory data on the quality of banks’ loan portfolio, we show that a similar portfolio of the lending and borrowing bank helps to overcome information asymmetries in interbank...

This paper makes a conceptual contribution to the e ffect of monetary policy on financial stability. We develop a microfounded network model with endogenous network formation to analyze the impact of central banks' monetary policy interventions on systemic risk. Banks choose their portfolio,...

The ability to accurately estimate the extent to which the failure of a bank disrupts the financial system is very valuable for regulators of the financial system. One important part of the financial system is the interbank payment system. This paper develops a robust measure, SinkRank, that...

We model a stylized banking system where banks are characterized by the amount of capital, cash reserves and their exposure to the interbank loan market as borrowers as well as lenders. A network of interbank lending is established that is used as a transmission mechanism for the failure of...

Evaluating creation of systemic risk is an ongoing regulatory activity and a difficult task given the dynamic linkages found in the financial system among multiple counterparties. This study evaluates the contributions to systemic risk in U.S. institutional prime money market funds (MMFs) from...

In 2022, US financial regulators proposed to mandate a single central clearing mechanism for treasury bonds and repo transactions to stabilize financial markets. The systemic risks inherent in repo markets were first highlighted by the global financial crisis and, as a response, global financial...

We quantify the gains from regulating maturity transformation in a model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors’ preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. Pecuniary...

We quantify the gains from regulating maturity transformation in a model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. Pecuniary...

We quantify the gains from regulating banks' maturity transformation in an infinite horizon model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic...