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For the class of cooperative games with transferable utilities an excess function e is defined as a function of two variables increasing in the first variable and decreasing in the first one such that given a TU game (N,v) , a coalition S, and a payoff vector x, the value e(v(S), x(S)) is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111369
A situation in which a finite set of agents can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (or simply a TU-game) where each agent is represented by one player in the game. In this paper, we assume that one agent can be represented by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113020
We introduce the concept of a transferable utility game with uncertainty (TUUgame). In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature may materialize and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013127559
We introduce several new solution concepts for cooperative games with arbitrary coalition structure. Of our main interest are coalitions structures being so-called building sets. A collection of sets is a building set if every singleton is a member and if the union of any two non-disjoint sets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128950
theory of games II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307317, 1953) to characterize our value. In addition, we … average approach provided by Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007). -- externalities ; marginal contributions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009355896
We resolve redundancies in the characterizations of the Banzhaf value suggested by Haller (1994, Int J Game Theory 23 …, 261-281) and Malawski (2002, Int J Game Theory 31:47-67). In particular, we show that the collusion properties employed by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009311608
On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506430
cooperative game theory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010239888
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i's prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225788
Agents participating in different kind of organizations, usually take different positions in some relational structure. The aim of this paper is to introduce a new framework taking into account both communication and hierachical features derived from this participation. In fact, this new set or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227326