) a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment and compensation under heterogenous moral hazard and risk aversion, and (ii …

This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …

masculine-faced CEOs' compensation is more sensitive to the risk of the firm. The result is robust when we use AI (artificial …

We provide evidence that CEO equity incentives, especially stock options, influence stock liquidity risk via … disclosure policy. Contributing to the literature on CEO risk-taking, we document a positive association between CEO options and … future systematic stock liquidity risk. Controlling for endogeneity, we show that information disclosure quality is an …

Influenced by their compensation plans, CEOs make their own luck through decisions that affect future firm risk. After … adopting a relative performance evaluation (RPE) plan, total and idiosyncratic risk are higher, and the correlation between …) plans. Plans including accounting-based performance metrics and/or cash payouts have weaker risk-related incentives. The …

between policy uncertainty and corporate risk-taking. We show that high levels of policy uncertainty are associated with … to their own firm and by reducing firm-level risk-taking. Furthermore, our results support the hypothesis that CEO risk …

right balance has been struck between “pay for performance” and risk? • To what extent were the problems that occurred at …