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Public contracts seem to be “expensive” and “inefficient” compared to pure private contracts. Higher prices and inefficiencies in the implementation of public contracts result from their specificity and rigidity, which is how public agents limit hazards from third-party opportunism. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067644
We study the impact of political contestability on the choice of rule-based contracts through the municipal bond market. We provide evidence that when the probability of losing office is high, mayors are more likely to issue expensive revenue bonds over cheaper general obligation bonds, and to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904731
Do public agents undertake socially inefficient activities to protect themselves? In politically contestable markets, part of the lack of flexibility in the design and implementation of the public procurement process reflects public agents' risk adaptations to limit the political hazards from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940346
We apply algorithmic data reading and textual analysis to compare the features of contracts in regulated industries subject to public scrutiny (which we call "public contracts") with contracts between non-governmental entities. We show that public contracts are lengthier and have more rule-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012972981
We study the link between the choice of rule-based public contracts and political hazards using the municipal bond market. While general obligation bonds are serviced from all municipal revenue streams and offer elected officials financial flexibility, revenue bonds limit the discretion that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013022180
We apply algorithmic data reading and textual analysis to compare the features of contracts in regulated industries subject to public scrutiny (which we call "public contracts") with relational private contracts. We show that public contracts are lengthier and have more rule-based rigid clauses;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013022182
We present a model of public procurement in which both contractual flexibility and political tolerance for contractual deviations determine renegotiations. In the model, contractual flexibility allows for adaptation without formal renegotiation while political tolerance for deviations decreases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482706