We analyze determinacy and stability under learning (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibria in the Blanchard and Galí (2006, 2008) New-Keynesian model of inflation and unemployment, where labor market frictions due to costs of hiring workers play an important role. We derive results...

We study the design of optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with labor turnover costs in which wages are set according to a right to manage bargaining where the firms' counterpart is given by currently employed workers. Our model captures well the salient features of European labor...

Monetary policy is most effective when public beliefs about future policies are actively managed. This is the appeal of policy rules and commitment strategies, typically absent under discretion. But when a policymaker has some private information - as is the case in reality - belief management...

This paper revisits the trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism using a New Keynesian model with uncertainty about the central banker's output gap target. It is shown that when this uncertainty is high, the trade-off no longer holds. In this case, the optimal combination...

The paper examines the optimal combination of central bank independence and conservatism in the presence of uncertain central bank preferences. We develop a model of endogenous monetary policy delegation in which government chooses the central bank's degree of inde-pendence and conservatism so...

I characterize optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a stochastic New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates may occasionally hit the zero lower bound. The benevolent policymaker controls the short-term nominal interest rate and the level of government spending. Under discretionary policy,...

We study the properties of the optimal nominal interest rate policy under different levels of price indexation. In our model indexation regulates the sources of inflation persistence. When indexation is zero, the inflation gap is purely forward- looking and inflation persistence depends only on...

This paper revisits the trade-of between central bank independence and conservatism using a New Keynesian model with uncertainty about the central banker's output gap target. It is shown that when this uncertainty is high, the trade-of no longer holds. In this case, the optimal combination...

We study the design of optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with labor turnover costs in which wages are set according to a right to manage bargaining where the firms' counterpart is given by currently employed workers. Our model captures well the salient features of European labor...