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desired coordination of actions even when a high order of mutual knowledge of payoff functions obtains. We want to make … explicit the role of knowledge about rationality of players, not only that of payoff functions. For this purpose, we use an … embedding belief systems, it is necessary that the upper bound order of mutual knowledge of payoff functions exceeds the upper …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321328
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365853
Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2012), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544158
Aim: Develop a methodological approach to reduce uncertainty of knowledge necessary for decision making in quick … recognized as a good paradigm in Kuhn’s sense suitable to build certain knowledge in the uncertain surroundings. So, it is the … for decision making processes based on uncertain information and knowledge. In this paper a methodology of introduction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013198731
realizable CURB set, represent the economy of knowledge of games' structures …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296791
We provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge and beliefs in game theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207179
The paper provides a specification of belief systems for models of large economies with anonymity in which aggregate states depend only on cross-section distributions of types. For belief systems satisfying certain conditions of mutual absolute continuity, the paper gives a necessary and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009007127
Rodrigues-Neto (2009) has shown that a given specification of posteriors of different players in an incomplete-information setting is compatible with a common prior if and only if the posteriors satisfy the so-called cycle equations. This note shows that, if, for any player, any element of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009007131
Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if … common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$ \emph{do} coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this … is the existence of a nonempty \emph{finite} event $F$ with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694981
desired coordination of actions even when a high order of mutual knowledge of payoff functions obtains. We want to make … explicit the role of knowledge about rationality of players, not only that of payoff functions. For this purpose, we use an … embedding belief systems, it is necessary that the upper bound order of mutual knowledge of payoff functions exceeds the upper …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332403