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A Revelation Mechanism for Soft Information Under Moral Hazard

Roger, Guillaume - 2015

This paper constructs a revelation mechanism to address a problem of moral hazard under soft information. The agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action, which she reports to the principal. Therefore the principal also faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. Economically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009978

Beliefs, payoffs, information : on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs

Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - 2012 - First version: December 1, 2008, This version: March 23, 2012

Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have shown that, in auctions with incomplete information about payoffs, full surplus extraction is only possible if agents’ beliefs about other agents are fully informative about their own payoff parameters. They argue that the set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010230371

Advising shareholders in takeovers

Levit, Doron - 2011

This paper studies the advisory role of the board of directors in takeovers. I develop a model in which the takeover … premium and the ability of the target board to resist the takeover are endogenous. The analysis relates the influence of the … and it is maximized when the board is biased against the takeover. Generally, uninformative and ignored recommendations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009355149

Optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries : conference paper

Rosar, Frank - 2013 - This version: February 5, 2013

I study the interaction between optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries. First, two sellers decide about outsourcing. By outsourcing, a seller loses information about the costs of producing to his supplier. Then the buyer designs the procurement mechanism and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340964

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

Mirrokni, Vahab - 2020

We introduce a new family of dynamic mechanisms that restricts sellers from using future distributional knowledge. Since the allocation and pricing of each auction period do not depend on the type distributions of future periods, we call this family of dynamic mechanisms non-clairvoyant.We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854936

Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets : Cutoff Mechanisms

Dworczak, Piotr - 2020

I study a mechanism design problem in which a designer allocates a single good to one of several agents, and the mechanism is followed by an aftermarket -- a post-mechanism game played between the agent who acquired the good and third-party market participants. The designer has preferences over...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012855036

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond

Deng, Yuan - 2019

We design a non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism under budget and ex-post individual rationality constraints that is dynamic incentive-compatible and achieves non-trivial revenue performance, even without any knowledge about the future. In particular, our dynamic mechanism obtains a constant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012871166

Mechanism Design Without Quasilinearity

Kazumura, Tomoya - 2017

This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model:(1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954673

Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - 2001

We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire covert information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists which provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165690

Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - 2001

We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists which provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014130155

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