This paper analyses whether different emissions trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation...

No international regime on climate change is going to be fully effective in controlling GHG emissions without the involvement of countries such as China, India, the United States, Australia, and possibly other developing countries. This highlights an unambiguous weakness of the Kyoto Protocol,...

This paper analyzes the consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. In our framework, international environmental policies are characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two...

The political brinkmanship of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam has been illustrated vividly by the way in which it brought forward its proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the United National Front Government. In the proposals the LTTE...

Bulow and Klemperer [1] have provided an upper bound on the value of bargaining power for a seller of an indivisible object. Specifically, negotiating optimally with N buyers yields lower revenue than an English auction with N + 1 buyers. In this paper, a short and intuitive proof of this result...

Our approach for automating the negotiation of business contracts proceeds in three broad steps. First, determine the structure of the negotiation process by applying general knowledge about auctions and domain-specific knowledge about the contract subject along with preferences from po- tential...