[E. Maskin, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{66} (1999) 23-38] is a seminal paper in the field of mechanism design and implementation theory. [J. Moore and R. Repullo, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099] and [B. Dutta and A. Sen, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991)...

The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in many economics fields. In this paper, we construct a simple labor model to show that a social choice function which can be implemented costly in Bayesian Nash equilibrium may not be truthfully implementable. The key point is the strategy cost...

[Moore and Repullo, Econometrica 58 (1990) 1083-1099] and [Dutta and Sen, Rev. Econom. Stud. 58 (1991) 121-128] are two fundamental papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Both of them are based on Maskin's classic paper [Maskin, Rev. Econom. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38]. A recent work [Wu, Inter. J....

The Maskin's theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design. In this paper, we will propose a self-enforcing agreement by which agents can fight a bad social choice rule which satisfies monotonicity and no-veto if an additional condition is satisfied. The agreement is based on...

The revelation principle has been known in the economics society for decades. In this paper, I will investigate it from a physical viewpoint, i.e., considering the energy consumed in performing a mechanism

Nash implementation and subgame perfect implementation are important topics in the theory of mechanism design. A recent work [Wu, Inter. J. of Quantum Information 9 (2011) 615-623] shows that when an additional condition is satisfied, the traditional result for Nash implementation shall be...

The Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple model that captures the essential contradiction between individual rationality and global rationality. Although the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is usually viewed simple, in this paper we will categorize it into five different types. For the type-4 Prisoner's...

Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. In addition, by using an algorithmic Bayesian...

The classical model of signaling games assumes that the receiver exactly know the type space (private information) of the sender and be able to discriminate each type of the sender distinctly. However, the justification of this assumption is questionable. It is more reasonable to let the...