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bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196760
other hand, too much competition always makes the equilibrium signaling less informative. -- Signalling ; Competition … violated. It is shown that more competition makes the equilibrium signaling more informative when the level of competition is … moderate. Moreover, the equilibrium signaling can perfectly reveal the ability under a certain level of competition. On the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747614
A decision maker (DM) determines a set of reactions that receivers can choose before senders and receivers move in a generalized competitive signaling model with two-sided matching. The DM’s optimal design of the unique stronger monotone signaling equilibrium (unique D1 equilibrium) is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212814
We study signaling in dynamic contests with heterogeneous players. A privately-informed challenger faces a sequence of rivals of known types. The type of future rivals determines which signal the challenger wants to produce, whereas the strategic response of current rivals determines the extent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013292789
I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two senders with common private information and conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the misrepresentation. The main results concern the amount of information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013463788
We analyze an oligopolistic competition with differentiated products and qualities. The quality of a product is not …-signaling competition. There are two regimes for separating equilibrium in our model depending on the parameters. Our analysis reveals that …, in one of the separating regimes, price signaling leads to intense price competition between the firms under which not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121803
In dynamic promotion contests, where performance measurement is noisy and ordinal, selection can be improved by biasing later stages in favor of early leaders. Even in the worst-case scenario, where noise swamps ability differences in determining relative performance, optimal bias is i) strictly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013362244
We consider the design of contests for n agents when the principal can choose both the prize profile and the contest success function. Our framework includes Tullock contests, Lazear-Rosen tournaments and all-pay contests as special cases, among others. We show that the optimal contest has an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012223823
We study a design problem for an effort-maximizing principal in a two-player contest with two dimensions of asymmetry. Players have different skill levels and an information gap exists, as only one player knows the skill difference. The principal has two policy instruments to redress the lack of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840836
violated. It is shown that more competition makes the equilibrium signaling more informative when the level of competition is … moderate. Moreover, the equilibrium signaling can perfectly reveal the ability under a certain level of competition. On the … other hand, too much competition always makes the equilibrium signaling less informative. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281680