In an experiment on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a...

We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived individuals care about the utility of their offspring who replace them in an infinitely repeated game. Each individual is unable to observe what happens before his entry in the game....

For repeated games with noisy private monitoring and communication, we examine robustness of perfect public equilibrium/subgame perfect equilibrium when private monitoring is close to some public monitoring. Private monitoring is close. to public monitoring if the private signals can generate...

In an experiment on the repeated prisoner s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a determinant...

This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring. The payoff set of this class of equilibria is characterized in the limit as the discount factor converges to one for games where players...

We introduce a class of two-player dynamic games to study the effectiveness of screening in a principal-agent problem. In every period, the principal chooses either to irreversibly stop the game or to continue, and the agent chooses an action if the principal chooses to continue. The agent's...

We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game...

People have a marginal role in managing forests located in the vicinity of their villages inNorthern India. This situation is scrutinised in this paper by studying strategic play of forestusers. Thereto, a 1 versus n−1 game of people's participation in forest management is estimatedfor three...

We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We de?ne dynamic mono- tonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost suf?cient for repeated...