This paper proposes a novel framework that generalizes the timing structure of games. Building on alternating move games and models of rational inattention, the players' actions may be rigid, i.e., infrequent. This rigidity in the timing of moves makes the game more dynamic and asynchronous,...

The paper re-examines Rogoff's [Rogoff, K., 1985. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 1169-1189.] influential monetary policy result. It shows that responses of a conservative central banker and the resulting macroeconomic...

Monetary and Fiscal policies interact in many ways. Recently the stance of fiscal policy in a number of countries has raised concerns about the risks for the outcomes of monetary policy. This paper first shows that these concerns are justified since, under ambitious fiscal policy makers,...

In existing game theoretic settings the timing of moves is deterministic, i.e. they occur with certainty at a pre-specified time. To add more realism we propose a framework in which, after an initial simultaneous move in time t = 0, one player gets to revise his action with positive probability...

The paper attempts to assess to what extent the central bank or the government should respond to developments that can cause financial instability, such as housing or asset bubbles, overextended budgetary policies, or excessive public and household debt. To analyse this question we set up a...

The paper analyzes interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, both in a single-country and in a monetary-union setting. As the policy interactions are strategic, we use game-theoretic methods. Specifically, we develop a framework that allows for an arbitrary, possibly stochastic timing...

We develop an asynchronous framework in which each player can optimally select the frequency of his moves based on cost-benefit considerations. To demonstrate how such ability to commit can alleviate coordination problems, we apply the framework to monetary policy.

In existing game theoretic settings the timing of moves is deterministic, i.e. they occur with certainty at a pre-specified time. To add more realism we propose a framework in which, after an initial simultaneous move in time t = 0, one player gets to revise his action with positive probability...

The paper attempts to assess to what extent the central bank or the government should respond to developments that can cause financial instability, such as housing or asset bubbles, overextended budgetary policies, or excessive public and household debt. To analyse this question we set up a...

Should independent monetary and fiscal policies coordinate their actions and/or targets? To examine this question the paper considers a simple reduced-form model in which monetary and fiscal policies are formally independent, but still interdependent—through their mutual spillovers. The...