Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K identical circles, with N K= 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They face...

Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K identical circles, with N K ≥ 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They...

Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K identical circles, with N greater than K which is greater or equal 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations...

Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K identical circles, with N K ≥ 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They...

Two firms sell a homogeneous product to two buyers who differ significantly in their valuation of the good and are allowed to charge (possibly) multiple two-part tariffs. Firms decide upon optimal prices and the choice of sales technologies which help acquire revenues from nonlinear prices....

Two firms selling a homogenous product to two types of buyers are involved in a sequential pricing game with zero costs. The pricing strategy available involves a fixed price and a royalty. It is shown that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with positive profits to both firms if...