We analyze related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their state-owned enterprise (SOEs) shareholders to examine whether companies benefit or lose from the presence of government shareholders and politically connected directors appointed by the government. We find that...

We analyze related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their state-owned enterprise (SOEs) shareholders to examine whether companies benefit from the presence of government shareholders and politically connected directors appointed by the government. We find that...

We examine a sample of 254 related party and arms' length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998-2000. Our analysis shows that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavorable prices compared to similar arms' length deals. Firms acquire assets from related...

We examine a sample of 375 filings of connected transactions between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders during 1998-2000. We address three questions: What types of connected transactions are likely to lead to expropriation of minority shareholders? Which firms are more...

We examine a sample of 254 related party and arms' length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998-2000. Our analysis shows that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavourable prices compared to similar arms' length deals. Firms acquire assets from...

We examine a sample of related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their controlling shareholders during 2001-2002. Minority shareholders in these firms seem to be subject to expropriation through tunneling but also gain from propping up. On balance, there is more...

We examine a sample of 328 filings of quot;connected transactionsquot; between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders during 1998-2000. We address three questions: What types of connected transactions are likely to lead to expropriation of minority shareholders? Which...

Owners-managers of closely held firms effectively decide on the level of their own compensation. We test the relationship between ownership concentration and executive compensation, using panel data for a sample of 412 Hong Kong firms during 1995-1998. We find a positive relationship between...