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In this Article we submit that the compensation structures at banks before the financial crisis were not necessarily flawed and that recent reforms in this area largely reflect already existing best practices. In Part I we review recent empirical studies on corporate governance and executive pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013132545
Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of variable pay if certain triggering conditions are met. As a result of regulatory responses to financial crises and corporate scandals as well as of growing shareholder pressure to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833330
the ashes, dominates public debate with strong statements regarding efficiency, justice, and what managers "deserve" - and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190088
The aim of this paper is to examine the executive compensation practices in closely-held financial institutions where the corporate governance conflict lies between the blockholder on one hand and minority shareholders and depositors on the other. We study the determinants of the level of bank's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075367
In March 2010, Japanese regulators implemented the country's first legislation concerning the disclosure of director compensation for named individuals. Using the first publicly available data for Japanese executives, we document direct evidence on the level, structure, and mechanisms of CEO...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917053
employed as a way of asset appropriation at the managers' discretion. The results also confirm that corporate governance is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490450
Panel OLS and GMM-IV estimates indicate that executives respond to the adoption of a compensation clawback provision by decreasing firm risk. The mechanisms that transmit incentives to decisions and decisions to risk appear to be more conservative investment and financial policies and preemptive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012107693
, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of … motives in managers' portfolio choices. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411812
We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable compensation spurred average turnover rates driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Other than that, banks‘ responses to raise fixed compensation sufficed to retain the vast...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012321323
We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable compensation did not induce an executive director exodus from EU banking because banks raised fixed compensation sufficiently to retain executives. However, risk-adjusted bank...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937866