that took place during the 2000–2009 period in the U.S., we find that firms with reverse takeover are more likely to … before the reverse takeover and the new firm is relatively smaller than the public shell. In addition, firms with new CEOs ….Practitioner/Policy Implications: Conventionally, firms try to improve the financial conditions of the merging firms to survive in the reverse takeover …

We argue that the extent to which a firm faces takeover threats affects its knowledge structure. In particular …, takeover threats may lead to managers' reluctance to adopt a strategy toward firm-specific knowledge accumulation, because … implementing this strategy requires them to acquire specialized skills, which are at risk under takeover threats. Conversely …

empire-building CEOs. The prospect of a future takeover means that CEOs with no ownership stake will over-invest in some …'s position in a hostile takeover induce raiders to launch friendly takeovers sooner. The increased takeover threat induces CEOs … takeover gains are high. Optimal ownership-generated incentives and the market for corporate control add more value after …

We show how directors can set the strength of a firm's anti-takeover provisions in order to influence the investment …-timing decision of a future empire-building CEO. The prospect of future hostile takeover attempts, which terminate the CEO's control … benefits if successful, affects the CEO's willingness to invest in low-value projects. If anti-takeover defenses are too strong …