Many countries have adopted criminal sanctions as a way to deter insider trading. Although criminal sanctions represent a much greater penalty than civil sanctions, the enforceability of criminal sanctions is weaker given the higher burden of proof required. This trade-off between severity and...

We examine the role of culture on the prevalence of illegal insider trading. Recent literature suggests that decisions and actions of economic decision-makers, including CEOs and managers, are influenced by behavioural biases (Shefrin, 2007). We hypothesize that nations where individuals are...

Many developed markets have taken what appears to be a tough stance on illegal insider trading through the use of criminal sanctions. Although criminal sanctions represent a much greater penalty than civil sanctions, the higher burden of proof required makes their enforceability weaker. This...

We explicitly examine the role of culture in corporate takeover decisions. Prior research suggests that the risk aversion of CEOs affects their takeover decisions. In this paper, we argue that managerial risk aversion at a national level is a cultural trait and affects the net synergies. CEOs of...

This paper proposes a novel approach to determine whether mutual funds time the market. The proposed approach builds on a heterogeneous agent model, where investors switch between cash and stocks depending on a certain switching rule. This represents a more flexible, intuitive, and parsimonious...

This paper examines the style-based feedback trading behavior of mutual fund managers. We provide an empirical version of the model for style-switching behavior of Barberis and Shleifer (2003). We find style-based feedback trading for 77% of the funds, half of which is positive- (negative-)...