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Governance mandates, outside directors, and acquirer performance

Dahya, Jay; Golubov, Andrey; Petmezas, Dimitris; … - 2016

We use hand-collected board data around the issuance of two distinct government-led board structure mandates in the U.K. to establish the effect of outside directors on acquirer performance. Increases in outside director representation are associated with better acquirer returns in deals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011646285

Corporate governance

Lehmann, Erik - 2018 - Version , November 19th 2018

markets and contracts, adverse selection and moral hazard problems occur, where delegated (selected) managers could act in … managers. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011928257

Does protectionist anti-takeover legislation lead to managerial entrenchment?

Frattaroli, Marc - 2018

I study a protectionist anti-takeover law introduced in 2014 that covers a subset of all firms in the economy. The law … takeover market by increasing the pay-for-performance sensitivity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011875653

The consequences to directors of deploying poison pills

Johnson, William C.; Karpoff, Jonathan M.; Wittry, … - 2019 - First complete draft: August 30, 2019

We examine the labor market consequences for directors who adopt poison pills. Directors who become associated with pill adoption experience significant decreases in vote margins and increases in termination rates across all their directorships. They also experience a decrease in the likelihood...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012120332

Founder CEOs and Acquirer Returns : Evidence from IPO Firms

Lee, Joon Mahn - 2016

Drawing from the literature on entrepreneurial overconfidence and M&As, we argue that founder CEO-managed firms perform worse than professional CEO-managed firms when they participate in M&A transactions. We test our predictions using a sample of acquisitions by newly listed US public firms from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012999723

Takeover Immunity, Takeovers and the Market for Non-Executive Directors

Ashraf, Rasha; Chakrabarti, Rajesh; Fu, Richard; … - 2015

Using a database that covers close to 3,000 listed companies in the United States during a ten year period from 1994 to 2003, we characterize non-executive directors' preference for ATP levels; examine the effect on their careers for changes in ATP levels and approval of acquisitions that create...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213482

The Power to Decide on Takeovers : Directors or Shareholders, What Difference Does It Make?

Gatti, Matteo - 2014

contribution is to show who actually has power in a takeover and what factors are at work to give such power. Although directors … are traditionally considered to be in charge in deciding the outcome of a hostile takeover of a Delaware corporation … lack the power to determine the outcome of a takeover bid, the reason for that is not embedded in the takeover regime …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153473

Governance, CEO Power, and Acquisitions

Oler, Derek; Olson, Bradley; Skousen, Christopher J. - 2009

We examine whether governance matters for acquisitions. Acquisitions are frequently beneficial to the CEO of the acquiring firm, but can often be value-destructive to acquirer shareholders and other stakeholders such as employees. We find that corporate governance does not appear to influence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014049776

Aggressive CEOs and Bank Mergers and Acquisitions

Ji, Mingming; Jiang, Liangliang - 2022

The U.S. banking industry has seen waves of mergers since the 1980s. Despite a significant body of research on the determinants of these waves, there are few studies of how CEOs influence banks’ mergers and acquisitions (M&As). This paper studies the effect of CEO aggressiveness on bank M&As....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013405017

Learning about Managerial Entrenchment in Dynamic Hostile Takeovers

Hu, Zehao; Huang, Chong - 2020

to incentivize entrenched managers to focus on shareholders' best interests. A fast-learning acquirer bids frequently and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014352304