We test the expectations hypothesis by analyzing changes in three month T-Bill rates (TB3) after FOMC meetings. By estimating the revisions in expectations of future overnight rates, we find a one-to-one relationship between changes in TB3 and path revisions.

In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...

This note studies the geometric ergodicity of nonlinear autoregressive models with conditionally heteroskedastic errors. A nonlinear autoregression of order p (AR(p)) with the conditional variance specified as the conventional linear autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model of order q...

We develop a utility based model of fluctuations, with nominal rigidities, and unemployment. In doing so, we combine two strands of research: the New Keynesian model with its focus on nominal rigidities, and the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model, with its focus on labor market frictions and...

We analyse how money as a store of value affects the decisions of a representative household under diversifiable and non-diversifiable risks given that the central bank successfully stabilizes the rate of inflation at a low level. Assuming exponential utility allows us to derive an explicit...

We consider an R&D-driven endogenous growth model in which innovation is risky and agents are risk averse. Growth is determined by the occupational choice of agents who can either work in production for a wage or become entrepreneurs. In this context, we examine the impact of redistributive...

Conducted in a framework which embodies tax-shifting opportunities, risk of losses and possibility of interjurisdictional loss-offset, this paper investigates a reform of multijurisdictional enterprises taxation, a move from Separate Accounting to Formulary Apportionment. Findings are summarised...

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium...