Narrow search
Showing 21 - 30 of 103,643
Cover Image
A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2021
Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609
Cover Image
When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in U.S. Electricity Generation
Cicala, Steve - 2013
Under what conditions does cost-of-service regulation lead firms to distort costs? This paper analyzes changes in fuel …-level legislation that ended cost-of-service regulation among investor-owned electric utilities in the late 1990s. I construct a … under cost-of-service regulation. I then show that the drop in the price of coal is associated with a reallocation of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153006
Cover Image
Lobbying in the Postal and Telecommunications Sectors : What Civil Servants Want
Clarke, Robert - 2014
In the postal and telecommunications sectors, operators and users’ groups employ regulatory specialists to monitor policy developments and to attempt to influence the direction those developments take. Among the contacts with whom these regulatory specialists must, in doing so, engage, are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014144811
Cover Image
Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation : Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation
Page, William H. - 2015
This article, published in 1987, responds to John Shepard Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1986). In an earlier article, I argued that the "clear articulation" requirement is the best criterion for "state action" antitrust immunity because it reinforces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207445
Cover Image
Lobbying and Regulation in a Political Economy : Evidence from the U.S. Cellular Industry
Duso, Tomaso - 2005
. Because of lobbying successfulness, firms avoided regulation in those markets where it would have been more effective …In this paper we empirically test the simultaneity between the effects and the determinants of price regulation in the …. Therefore, regulation did not significantly reduce cellular tariffs in regulated markets but it would have decreased them if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074586
Cover Image
Entrepreneurial Innovations, Entrepreneurship Policy and Globalization
Douhan, Robin; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - 2009
policy in a lobbying model taking into account the con.ict of interest between entrepreneurs and incumbents. It is shown that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320207
Cover Image
The regulation of interdependent markets
Fiocco, Raffaele; Scarpa, Carlo - 2011
that centralized regulation is preferable. Under asymmetric information about the firms' costs, lobbying induces a unique … between the goods is high enough, the firms' lobbying activity may be so strong that decentralizing the regulatory structure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281488
Cover Image
A pure bureaucratic-entrepreneurial theory of deposit insurance adoption
Chu, Kam Hon - In: Review of Economic Analysis : REA 13 (2021) 3, pp. 253-291
Based on Becker, Kane, Niskanen, and Peltzman's ideas, we develop a model to explain why deposit insurance is adopted even though policymakers are aware of its pitfalls in both theory and practice. In our model, the regulator acts as both a bureaucrat and an entrepreneur to maximize his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012886290
Cover Image
A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture
De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2021
Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236193
Cover Image
A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2021
Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013238146