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Government Guarantees and Bank Risk Taking Incentives

Fischer, Markus - 2014

This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055384

Government Guarantees and Bank Risk Taking Incentives

Fischer, Markus - 2014

This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013058965

Bailouts of Systemically Relevant Banks Do Not Create Moral Hazard

Birchler, Urs - 2016

Many economists and policy-makers believe that bailouts of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), though unavoidable ex post, are inefficient ex ante: The expectation of such bailouts is said to lead to moral hazard in the form of excessive risk taking. We argue that this view...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986783

The Marketability of Bank Assets and Managerial Rents : Implications for Financial Stability

Fecht, Falko - 2016

Ongoing financial innovation and greater information availability increase the tradability of bank assets and reduce … banks' dependence on individual bank managers as private information in the lending process declines. In this paper we argue … bank managers and shareholders becomes less severe. Consequently, banks' capital structure needs to be less concerned with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989289

Removing Moral Hazard and Agency Costs in Banks : Beyond CoCo Bonds

Hori, Kenjiro - 2016

The convex payoffs for equity holders in a corporate structure results in agency costs and moral hazard problems. The implicit government guarantee for banks accentuates these. We believe that the Basel III related bail-in contingent convertible (CoCo) structures do only not solve these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994839

What Does Matched Bank-Firm Data Tell Us about the Moral Hazard in Lending Decisions of State-Owned Banks in India?

Gopalakrishnan, Balagopal - 2018

prediction model where the bank type is determined by observable risk proxies such as ex-ante credit ratings, which influence the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932135

Institutions, Moral Hazard and Expected Government Support of Banks

Antzoulatos, Angelos A. - 2014

We model the expected support of banks with credit ratings from Moody's and Fitch, taking explicitly into account the capacity and willingness of governments to provide support in case of need, as well as their concerns about moral hazard (i.e., that the expected support may induce banks to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013063698

Has Regulatory Capital Made Banks Safer? Skin in the Game vs Moral Hazard

Dautović, Ernest - 2020

gambling for resurrection, the risk-taking is driven by large and less profitable banks. The net impact on bank probabilities …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012827421

Equity, Debt and Moral Hazard : The Optimal Structure of Banks’ Loss Absorbing Capacity

Tanaka, Misa - 2018

This paper develops a model to analyse the optimal ex-ante capital and total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements, and the ex-post resolution policy of banks. Banks in our model are subject to two types of moral hazard: i) ex-ante, they have the incentive to shirk on project monitoring,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913736

Interbank network as a channel of credit contagion in banks : is moral hazard transferable?

Jović, Željko; Đaković, Milena Lutovac - In: Journal of central banking theory and practice 11 (2022) 3, pp. 117-135

The objective of this research is to examine the inter-bank network of clients as a channel for credit risk … banking network channel. There were different models of bank behaviour, from a group of banks that fully aligned their risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013407507