In recent years firms have been shifting their executive compensation packages from plain stock and option grants to grants with accounting-based performance vesting provisions and awards that benchmark firm performance against those of a designated peer group. One potential explanation for this...

We examine the effect of corporate governance on both CEO compensation and several financial performance indicators in a sample of Dutch hospitals. In a series of pooled regressions, we find evidence that supports earlier findings in the literature. For instance, our results indicate that the...

Using a sample of US bank mergers from 1995 to 2012, we observe that the pre-post merger changes in CEO bonus are significantly negatively related to the strength of corporate governance within the bidding bank. This suggests that bonus compensation is not consistent with the “optimal...

Over the period 2005 through 2015, we find that director compensation in Chinese listed firms is influenced by both director characteristics and ownership structure. We measure director compensation by both the propensity to be paid and the level of compensation. For independent directors, we...

I examine the effects of board member departures on CEO compensation using a sample of high growth IPO firms. Agency theory predicts that a reduction in board monitoring by harvester directors (VCs and private equity investors) will result in an increase in CEO pay. I find that departures of the...

An unprecedented number of firms announced CEO salary reductions at the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, which we argue was triggered by an exogenous increase in stakeholder outrage toward executive pay. We document that the overall compensation of these CEOs did not meaningfully decrease...

Using 256 TARP recipients, I find that markets negatively react to the news on limiting executive compensations. Although investors react quite positively for the initial announcement of TARP on October 14, 2008, other announcements regarding compensation regulation including a strict $500,000...

We analyze how boards' reputational concerns influence executive compensation and the use of hidden pay. Independent boards reduce disclosed pay to signal their independence, but are more likely than manager-friendly boards to use hidden pay or to distort incentive contracts. Stronger...

We explore the effect of institutional directors on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay (total, fixed, and variable compensation). We delve particularly into the impact of pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional directors, who, respectively, represent institutional investors who...