We develop an economic analysis in order to examine the effects of consumer, regulatory, and competitive pressure on firm investments in environmentally friendly production. Specifically, we ask: Why do firms vary in their levels of environmental innovation? Under what conditions are such...

We develop an economic analysis in order to examine the effects of consumer, regulatory, and competitive pressure on firm investments in environmentally friendly production. Specifically, we ask: Why do firms vary in their levels of environmental innovation? Under what conditions are such...

We present a theory of entrepreneurial behavior that explores the relationship between overconfidence and successful firm outcomes, such as acquisition or IPO. In our model, increasing overconfidence produces two conflicting effects on the probability of a successful outcome: it not only induces...

With our planet's environment facing increasing threat of irreparable damage, academics, practitioners, and policy-makers are becoming more focused on the incentives of individuals, corporations, and governments to act in the interests of the environment. Since the environment is a public good,...

We develop a participation/ratification/transfer game-theoretic model representing an international environmental agreement, motivated by the recent COP26 Glasgow agreement attempting to eliminate deforestation activities. We consider the economic (including transfers from the developed nations)...

I consider the effects of entrepreneurial inequity-aversion on financial contracting with a self-interested venture capitalist, in a single-sided and double-sided moral hazard setting. In the pure principal-agent model, as the proportion of self-interested entrepreneurs in the population...

We examine the combined effects of managerial overconfidence, asymmetric information and moral hazard problems on the manager's choice of financing (debt or equity). We demonstrate the following; a) in the asymmetric information model, overconfidence is unambiguously bad. It induces excessive...

We develop a model of Bertrand competition in differentiated products, in order to examine the relationship between product market competition and financial leverage. Leverage softens price competition by inducing firms to discount the future more heavily. We consider potential intensity and...

We analyse bargaining between a venture capitalist and a manager over their financial contract. We consider three main questions. What is the effect of bargaining, and when will it provide the first-best solution? What is the effect of bidding between competitive venture capitalists to supply...