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Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation

Chen, Tao - 2020

This paper studies how managerial compensation is shaped by the risk preference of shareholders. Firms with a large ownership held by "dual holders'' -- institutional investors that simultaneously hold equity and bonds of the company -- choose a less risk-inducing compensation structure....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848455

Board Monitoring, CEO Incentives, and Shareholder Activism

Keusch, Thomas - 2018

This paper studies how hedge fund activism reshapes board monitoring, CEO incentives and compensation. I find that activists target CEOs who have co-opted the board, have poor performance records and weak equity portfolio incentives, are less subject to relative performance evaluation (RPE) but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936387

On the Valuation of Performance Fees and Their Impact on Asset Managers’ Incentives

Dai, Wei; Merton, Robert C.; Rizova, Savina - 2021

This paper provides a robust and practical framework for assessing performance fees. The fee valuation uses standard option pricing models and therefore does not require any expected return or alpha estimate. These features make our framework easy to use, robust, and widely applicable to a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013225263

Incentive Realignment : Mutual Funds’ Influence on Executive Compensation Contracts

Agarwal, Vikas; Cao, Sean; Huang, Shawn X.; Kim, Min - 2021

corroborate these findings to reveal more pronounced effects when fund managers have stronger career incentives and are less …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236397

Manager Fee Contracts and Managerial Incentives

Zhan, Gong - 2010

and mutual fund managers. We find that the option-like performance fee structure prevalent among hedge funds is suboptimal … the water and when the manager's skill is poor. Allowing managers to invest personal wealth in their own funds, however …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013145185

Motivating Collusion

Ha, Sangeun; Ma, Fangyuan; Zaldokas, Alminas - 2022

increased the sensitivity of executive pay to local rivals' performance, consistent with rewarding the managers for colluding …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321555

Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices

Buffa, Andrea M - 2019

We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced … distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight …. Noise traders bias prices upward because constraints make it harder for managers to underweight overvalued assets, which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904735

A Simple Model of Managerial Incentives and Portfolio-Investment Decision

Deng, Binbin - 2017

What is the optimal portfolio allocation when an agent is investing both for a firm and for himself? I address this question by solving a manager's decision problem under a specific executive compensation structure. Specifically, I study how flat wage and stock compensation affect the manager's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947744

Which Incentives Do Portfolio Managers' Compensations Induce?

Wang, Yanjie; Xu, Jing - 2022

Mutual fund managers' compensation packages often contain relative performance-dependent components such as year …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014238831

How do labor representatives affect incentive orientation of executive compensation?

Dyballa, Katharina; Kraft, Kornelius - 2016

Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that labor's interest may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526742