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Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets : Empirical Evidence from China

Wang, Jiwei - 2013

performance because cross-subsidization makes it difficult for group CEOs to hold the managers in strong firms accountable for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074547

Agency Cost of CEO Perquisite in the Bank Loan Contracts

Chan, Chia-Ying - 2017

This study investigates whether CEO perquisite of borrowing firms plays any significant role, both in terms of price and non-price settings, in financial contracts and reveals that lending banks demand significantly higher return (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964677

Corporate Cash Holdings and CEO Compensation Incentives

Liu, Yixin - 2010

We examine the effect of CEO compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests may influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150559

Clawback Provisions in Executive Compensation Contracts

Stark, Johanna - 2020

Clawbacks are contractual provisions in executive compensation contracts that allow for an ex post recoupment of variable pay if certain triggering conditions are met. As a result of regulatory responses to financial crises and corporate scandals as well as of growing shareholder pressure to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833330

Does CDS Trading Affect Risk-Taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation?

Chen, Jie - 2019

We find that managers receive more risk-taking incentives in their compensation packages once their firms are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895543

How Do Independent Directors View Powerful Executive Risk-Taking Incentives? A Quasi-Natural Experiment

Ongsakul, Viput - 2019

Motivated by agency theory, we explore how independent directors view managerial risk-taking incentives using a natural experiment. We exploit the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an exogenous shock that raised board independence. Our difference-in-difference estimates show that independent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896321

Value-Risk Tradeoffs and Managerial Incentives

Tsui, David - 2018

managers' incentive compensation packages. I find that shareholder value increases with risk and therefore managerial risk … aversion creates potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. I also find that firms provide managers with … idiosyncratic (rather than systematic) risk and managers are more risk-averse. Collectively, these results suggest that firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936802

Managerial Incentives for Attracting Attention

Papiashvili, Nino - 2017

This paper studies the mechanisms which motivate and allow managers to engage in cheap talk and attract market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012945811

Performance-Based Vesting Compensation and Debt Contracting

King, Tao-Hsien Dolly - 2019

This paper examines whether the risk-taking incentives induced by performance-based vesting (p-v) compensation influence bank loan contracting and credit ratings. Consistent with our risk-shifting hypothesis, we find that the p-v based compensation, as measured by the proportion of grant date...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865414

Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Merger Decisions

Lin, Chen - 2017

(CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with higher inside …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974548