Showing 61 - 70 of 448,037
This study investigates how directors' and officers' liability insurance (hereafter D&O insurance) affects corporate …&O liability insurance is positively associated with corporate diversification, particularly unrelated diversification. In addition …, we find that when diversification does occur, excessive D&O liability insurance worsens the shareholder value destroyed a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013077509
This paper investigates under what circumstances boards of directors fire CEOs and whether this action leads to better firm performance. We use unique and detailed data, covering 473 companies in the transition region, on boards’ actions, expectations and beliefs about CEO ability. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003916269
We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008702077
We study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether such monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private-equity-backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038891
We study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether such monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private-equitybacked firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940695
Our hand-collected sample of 298 U.S. SPACs reveals that the modal SPAC CEO is a 50-year-old male MBA graduate with substantial financial expertise. In accordance with signaling theory, greater reputation gained through prior CEO experience in public companies is linked to larger SPACs. As the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013239866
We study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether such monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private-equity-backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013037409
We examine whether governance matters for acquisitions. Acquisitions are frequently beneficial to the CEO of the acquiring firm, but can often be value-destructive to acquirer shareholders and other stakeholders such as employees. We find that corporate governance does not appear to influence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014049776
Harnessing CEO overconfidence whilst exploiting their risk appetite and over-optimism has long been of interest to management scholars and firms. We find that overconfident CEOs’ reluctance to access external financing indicates that they reduce their acquisition activity at high rating...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013403392
This paper investigates the impact of insurance contract design on the behavior of filing fraudulent claims in an … experimental setup. We test how fraud behavior varies for insurance contracts with full coverage, a straight deductible or variable … extent of claim build-up compared to full coverage contracts. In contrast, bonus-malus contracts with variable insurance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003987689