Consider a Bertrand model in which each firm may be inactive with a known probability, so the number of active firms is uncertain. This simple model has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which industry profits are positive and decline with the number of firms, the same features which make the...

We consider a multi-stage game where firms first choose product quality and then compete for sales in the product market. We show how the equilibrium qualities are influenced by timing (sequential or simultaneous) of quality choices depends on the type of competition (Bertrand or Cournot) in the...

In this paper we are studying the question under which circumstances a firm with a first-mover advantage may get leapfrogged by a follower. At the market stage we assume a Stackelberg structure, i.e. the leader commits to a quantity and the follower then reacts to it. It is well-known that the...

While competition between firms producing substitutes is well understood, less is known about rivalry between complementors. We study the interaction between firms in markets with one-way essential complements. One good is essential to the use of the other but not vice versa, as arises with an...