compensation mechanism that firms use to motivate managers to innovate during crises, as an important driver that improves firm … able to innovate by compensating managers with options. We identify exogenous variation in option compensation using …

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at …-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and greater pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta). These effects are more substantial if VC …-taking incentives of the CEO instilled by such directors. Lastly, we find that having VC directors on nominating and/or governance …

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at …-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta). These effects are more substantial if VC directors are … boards of public firms is partly explained by increased risk-taking incentives of the CEO instilled by such directors. Lastly …

the credibility they lend to the announcing managers. Using a sample of 762 earnings forecasts for the period of 2002 … account the term-structure of managerial incentives when they trade on the announced forecasts. In particular, I find that … positive forecast surprises by the managers with larger short-term equity-based compensation are treated as less credible by …

-neutral analysis of the performance volatility incentives created by investment management fee structures. This paper extends FLa in … determines if the contract renewal structure and fee arrangements discriminate effectively among talented and untalented managers …

managerial incentives affect these characteristics. In this paper, we examine whether managers strategically choose the precision …Managers have great discretion in determining management forecast characteristics, but little is known about how … managers strategically choosing the precision of their earnings forecasts to increase stock prices before insider sales and to …

incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self …Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial … purchases. These results are consistent with managers strategically choosing forecast precision to increase stock prices before …

risk to managers and encouraging risk-substitution; that is, managers with relatively undiversified personal portfolios …

%. The Pay Gap between the CEO and its subordinate executives (tournament incentives) also plays a major role in lowering IPO … failure risk. The effectiveness of CEO pay is strengthened among well-governed firms, whereas tournament incentives are …