Theory posits that managerial holdings of debt (“inside debt”) align managers' incentives with those of outside debtholders. Executive pensions, which consist of ERISA-qualified rank-and-file (RAF) plans and Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs), and other deferred compensation...

Capital structure, especially in the cases of the countries that belong in the Continental Europe system of Corporate Governance has a significant impact on the way that the firm is structured, organizationally, strategically and functionally. The decision to use the capital market or debt in...

Using quantile regression, our results provide explanations for the inconsistent findings that use conventional OLS regression in the extant literature. While the direct effects of RD while firms' advantages with low RD whereas it is decreasing in high Q firms. Main banks add value for low to...

We examine whether the effect of increased creditor rights on corporate borrowing depends on firm's access to internal capital. By exploiting a creditor protection reform in India, empirical outcomes strongly indicate that strengthening of creditor rights leads to increased corporate borrowing...

This paper examines the impact of concentrated equity ownership (blockholders) on the corporate debt maturity structure within the framework of agency theory. Using a novel and hand-collected data set from 2000 to 2015 in Australia, we find support for our hypothesis that debt maturity is a...

Within the same debt contract, some financial covenants are considerably more restrictive than others. I exploit this heterogeneity in covenant design and show that the design of the most restrictive covenant is systematically associated with covenant outcomes - compliance, violations, or...

While recent studies show that long vesting periods in managerial compensation increase corporate investments, it may reshape the shareholder-debtholder conflict as shareholders have to split the gains with creditors. We find that firms with longer CEO pay durations use more short-maturity...

Corporate debt maturity is a concave function of financial leverage when the debt has restrictive asset-based covenants attached. This concavity kicks in earlier with increasing covenant tightness and is absent when firms have no restrictive asset-based covenants. We argue that this concavity is...

I develop a dynamic capital structure model in which shareholders determine a firm's leverage ratio, debt maturity, and default strategy. In my model, the firm's debt matures all at once. Therefore, after repaying the principal shareholders own all the firm's cash flows and can pick a new...

This study examines whether and how CEO equity incentives relate to financing choices (i.e., debt and leases). Using manually collected CEO compensation and lease data for a sample of large UK firms, we found evidence of a negative relationship between CEO equity incentives and firm leverage. We...