This paper provides a complete characterization of equilibria in a game-theoretic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique symmetric equilibrium always exists. Exact conditions...

The standard economic analysis of the insured-insurer relationship under moral hazard postulates a simplistic setup that hardly explains the many features of an insurance contract. We extend this setup to include the situation that the insured was facing at the time of the accident and the...

A tontine provides a mortality driven, age-increasing payout structure through the pooling of mortality. Because a tontine does not entail any guarantees, the payout structure of a tontine is determined by the pooling of individual characteristics of tontinists. Therefore, the surrender decision...

Guaranteed renewability is a prominent feature in many health and life insurance markets. It is well established in the literature that, when there is (only) risk type uncertainty, the optimal GR contract with renewal price set at the actuarially fair price for low risk types provides full...

We solve the general problem of optimal risk sharing among a nite number of agents with limited liability. We show that the optimal allocation is characterized by endogenously determined ranks assigned to the participating agents and a hierarchical structure of risk sharing, where all agents...

On-demand insurance is an innovative business model from the InsurTech space, which provides coverage for episodic risks. It makes use of a simple fact in a practical way: People differ in their frequency of exposure as well as the probability of loss. The extra dimension of heterogeneity can be...

We investigate competitive equilibria in a special type of incomplete markets, referred to as a comonotone market, where agents can only trade such that their risk allocation is comonotonic. The comonotone market is motivated by the no-sabotage condition. For instance, in a standard insurance...

Can variations in immunization rates be accounted for by differences in information and commitment technologies? I document four salient facts regarding DPT vaccination rates: (i) lower immunization in countries with greater costs of contract enforcement, (ii) higher volatility in immunization...

In Ghossoub (2019), we studied a problem of optimal insurance design under belief heterogeneity. We examined the effect of the divergence in beliefs, and the singularity between the beliefs, on optimal indemnities; and we provided a closed-form characterization of optimal indemnity schedules. In...

This paper studies bilateral risk-sharing with no aggregate uncertainty, when agents maximize rank-dependent utilities. We characterize the structure of Pareto optimal risk-sharing contracts in full generality. We then derive a necessary and sufficient condition for Pareto optima to be...