This paper shows that any attempt to deviate from the basic bargaining line is doomed to fail. The Cournot attempt results in undistributed pie, while the Rubinstein-Binmore one in insufficient distribution. Discount rate may be important to bargaining, but game theorists have not been...

This paper proves that Rubinstein's bargaining theory is completely wrong. Using the Edgeworth box to solve the bargaining problem requires two pies. A reduced Edgeworth box may contain one pie, but it requires someone smarter than Ricardo to work out a common terms of trade. Rubinstein's...

A new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining mechanism studied in Chatterjee et. al. (1993). This mechanism is used to analyze two classes of coalitional games with transferable utility. One class is that of strictly...

In "Bargaining to Lose: The Permeability Approach to Post Transition Resource Extraction" Natasha Chichilnisky-Heal introduces an original and fertile explanation for the resource curse. Her "permeability" approach questions the treatment of the state as a decision maker having the public good...

We introduce a model of product development in a firm. Our model describes the process as a multi-stage contest (i.e., race) with an endogenous length (with one stage or two stages) between two workers. We model the payments to workers from the new product using the normatively appealing Nash...

This supplement provides proofs of all propositions in [Tomohiko Kawamori and Toshiji Miyakawa, "Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations," Operations Research Letters 45(5), 427-430, 2017]

The housing rental market offers a unique laboratory for studying price stickiness. This paper is motivated by two facts: 1. Tenants' rents are remarkably sticky even though regular and expected recontracting would, by itself, suggest substantial rent flexibility. 2. Rent stickiness varies...

This paper introduces a class of endogenously proportional bargaining solutions. These solutions are inside the class of Directional solutions, which Chun and Thomson (1987) proposed to generalize (exogenously) proportional solutions of Kalai (1977). Endogenously proportional solutions are...

I consider a bargaining game in which, unlike the standard economic bargaining game (e.g. Rubenstein, 1982), only one player can make proposals. I also assume that the space of proposals is finite. Thus, the game is akin to (i) a CEO's proposing a hire who must be okayed by a board of directors,...

We study a bargaining model in which a buyer makes frequent offers to a privately informed seller, while gradually learning about the seller's type from “news.” We show that the buyer's ability to leverage this information to extract more surplus from the seller is remarkably limited. In...