This is a chapter for a forthcoming volume Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press 2014) (eds. Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, and Jennifer Payne). It provides an overview of EU financial regulation from the first banking directive up until its most recent developments in...

We propose a simple network–based methodology for ranking systemically important financial institutions. We view the risks of firms –including both the financial sector and the real economy– as a network with nodes representing the volatility shocks. The metric for the connections of the...

Since increasing a bank's capital requirement to improve the stability of the financial system imposes costs upon the bank, a regulator should ideally be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that banks classified as systemically risky really do create systemic risk before subjecting them to...

This paper documents that banks with higher non-interest income (noncore activities like investment banking, venture capital and trading activities) have a higher contribution to systemic risk than traditional banking (deposit taking and lending). After decomposing total non-interest income into...

We suggest that banks contribute extensively to systemic risk only if they are both “risky” and centrally placed in the financial network. To calculate systemic risk we apply the ∆CoVaR measure of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and measure centrality using detailed US loan syndication...

The central problem for financial regulation is reducing systemic risk. Systemic risk is the risk that the failure of one significant institution can cause or significantly contribute to the failure of other significant institutions. This paper addresses the five most important policies for...

The correlation bias refers to the fact that claim subordination in the capital structure of the firm influences claim holders' preferred degree of asset correlation in portfolios held by the firm. Using the copula capital structure model, it is shown that the correlation bias shifts shareholder...

In June 2016, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision warned that capital relief transactions “can be complex, artificial and opaque” and reduce capital requirements. In this article, we analyse the structure of synthetic ‘balance sheet' securitisations, which have, inter alia, the...