This paper investigates whether transparent markets can survive when faced with direct competition from less transparent markets. We first construct a game-theoretic model in which in equilibrium the low-transparency dealers capture early order flow, and use the resulting informational advantage...

This study uses laboratory experiments to determine the effects of trade and quote disclosure on market efficiency, bid-ask spreads and trader welfare. We show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices, but also increases opening bid-ask spreads,...

This study examines the behavior of laboratory markets in which two uninformed market makers compete to trade with heterogeneously informed investors. The data provide three main results. First, market makers set quotes to protect against adverse selection and to control inventory. Second, when...

We provide evidence that credit investors do not fully impound the implications of firms' cost structure when pricing credit default swaps. Information about firms' cost structure is not disclosed and needs to be estimated. Furthermore, the performance implications of firms' cost structure...

This paper uses experimental asset markets to investigate the evolution of liquidity in anelectronic limit order market. Our market setting includes salient features of electronic markets, as well as informed traders and liquidity traders. We focus on the strategies of the traders, andhow these...

In this research we investigate the behavior of noise traders and their impact on the market. We do this in an experimental market setting that allows us to determine not only how noise traders fare in a competitive asset market with other traders, but also how the equilibrium changes if a...

In an environment where capital market participants collectively possess superior information about a decision faced by a firm manager, we use an experimental market to analyze the effectiveness with which the market communicates this information to the manager through stock price. We do so in a...

We present 179 investment professionals with a scenario that manipulates whether a male or female analyst persists in pitching a stock pick after it has been voted down. Respondents evaluate analysts as less promotable when they do not persist, but only if the analyst is female. Results are...

Prior surveys have documented that elite US managers see operating distortions as more acceptable ways to hit benchmarks than reporting distortions (Bruns and Merchant 1990; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). To assess the generality of this difference and understand variation in attitudes toward...

A good Professor achieves a three part mission of research, teaching and service. After elaborating on this mission, I provide some broad strategies for accomplishing it: know when to say no; don't try to win the measurement game; don't be a jerk (in the technical sense); “think otherwise”,...