This paper extends a well-known macroeconomic stabilization game between monetary and fiscal authorities introduced by Dixit and Lambertini (American Economic Review, 93: 1522-1542) to multiplicative (policy) uncertainty. We find that even if fiscal and monetary authorities share a common output...

This paper extends the stabilization game between monetary and fiscal authorities to the case of multiplicative (model) uncertainty. In this context, the “symbiosis assumption”, i.e. fiscal and monetary policy share the same ideal targets, no longer guarantees the achievement of ideal output...

We apply a three-tier hierarchical model of regulation, developed along the lines of Laffont and Tirole (1993), to an adverse selection problem in the corporate bond market. The bank brings the bonds to the market and informs the potential buyers about the bond risks; a unique benevolent public...

We apply a three-tier hierarchical model of regulation, developed along the lines of Laffont and Tirole’s (1993), to an adverse selection problem in the corporate bond market. The bank brings the bonds to the market and informs the potential buyers about the bonds’ risk; a unique...

We apply a three-tier hierarchical model of regulation, developed along the lines of Laffont and Tirole's (1993), to an adverse selection problem in the corporate bond market. The bank brings the bonds to the market and informs the potential buyers about the bonds' risk; a unique benevolent...