Permanent or long-term large shareholders have different governance incentives and mechanisms from institutional investors. Liquidity could facilitate either cutting and running by large shareholders or, alternatively, increased monitoring. Using an exogenous shock to liquidity in China, we...

We analyze voting records for management proposals and find that investors today hold directors accountable for a much wider range of issues, such as climate change and board diversity, than in the past. Within environment, climate change is the only subcategory that is significantly associated...

Many indicators have been developed at international level to evaluate the quality of corporate governance. In this paper, the fundamental elements and limitations of existing indicators are discussed. Among these indicators, particular attention has been focused on the GIM Index, an index...

This paper analyzes the economic rationale for board regulation in place and for introducing new regulation in the future. We relate the value of the firm to the use of employee directors, board independence, directors with multiple seats, and to gender diversity. Our evidence shows that the...

Do the performance pressures of the capital market exacerbate short-termism and stifle innovation? This longstanding question has doggedly eluded a conclusive answer due to conflicting empirical findings. We revisit two studies that have been central to rejecting short-termism: Atanassov (2013)...

Using instrumental variables, we find that having more antitakeover provisions is not only more likely to prevent a bid but also more likely to cause management resistance in the event of not doing so. The deterrent effect is likely to be decreasing in the cost to rival bidders of acquiring...

This paper studies how directors' reputational concerns affect board structure, corporate governance, and firm value. In our setting, directors affect their firms' governance, and governance, in turn, affects firms' demand for new directors. Whether the labor market rewards a...

We show that dual-class shares can be a solution to agency conflicts rather than a result of agency conflicts. When firms with a controlling shareholder issue voting shares to fund projects, the risk of losing control rises, which can threaten the controller's private benefits. Thus, incumbents...

Board composition and role have been under close scrutiny both in the academic and "civil" worlds. Independence has been advocated as a way to reinforce the board's power over the managers. However, the empirical literature does not find convincing results to support this view. This paper offers...