We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market (CEO turnover and remuneration schemes) in two different regulatory regimes, namely before and after the sweeping governance reforms adopted in the UK in the 1990s. We employ sample selection models to examine firms in a...

The market for corporate control is generally regarded as an important disciplinary mechanism in well developed economies. Entrenchment mechanisms commonly used by US firms in the form of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) may offer some protection from disciplinary action, facilitating...

The book proposes an original contribution to the economics and finance literature by developing the foundations of corporate finance. It also covers in detail various corporate governance issues faced by organizations. The common treatment of corporate finance and corporate governance started...

The present paper is inspired by the increased application of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) into several policy areas, such as immigration and employment. The OMC has been lately in the epicenter of numerous academic debates related to the rationalization and the effectiveness of the...

We study, for the first time, whether and how directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance affects independent directors' voting. We provide new evidence that D&O insurance through the insurance channel and the insurance-monitoring channel incentivizes independent directors to monitor. The positive...

Corporate governance systems exist to discourage self-interested behavior. One question that is often overlooked is how extensive these systems should be. A look at corporate governance today suggests that self-interest is high because companies are compelled - by regulators and the market - to...

Contingent control (CC) is a key enabler of startup growth and venture capital. To preserve adequate incentives and mitigate risks, venture finance deals distribute startups’ governance rights among investors and founders based on performance measures at different points in time. For example,...

This paper studies the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on managerial compensation horizon under common ownership. We find that the predominant governance approach under common ownership is the threat of exit, which inadvertently exacerbates managerial myopia. Hence, common owners tend...

This paper studies the interactions between monitoring choices in different firms. Shareholders gather information about a common industry shock and subsequently intervene with management. An information externality arises because intervention transmits information about industry conditions to...