This paper first introduces an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies do operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting...

We provide a theoretical framework to discuss the relation between market size and vertical structure in the railway industry. The framework is based on a simple downstream monopoly model with two input suppliers, labor forces and the rail infrastructure firm. The operation of the downstream...

This paper provides a novel rationale for the regulation of market size when heterogeneous firms compete. A regulator seeks to maximize total welfare by choosing the number of firms allowed to enter the market, e.g. by issuing a certain number of licenses. Opening up the market for more firms...

We investigate the possibility for two vertically related firms to at least partially collude on the wholesale price over an in.nite horizon to mitigate or eliminate the e¤ects of double marginalisation, thereby avoiding contracts which might not be enforceable. We characterise alternative...

In this paper we consider a market situation in which initially there is an unintegrated monopoly upstream that owns an essential facility and two dowstream firms. Then the market is liberalized allowing upstream entry and vertical integration. The equilibrium entry mode - sharing the incumbent...

This paper investigates the benefits of a merger when goods are complements and firms behave in a Cournot manner both in a theoretical model as well as in a real-world application. In a setting of two complementary duopolies a merger between two firms each producing one of the goods always...

We present sufficient conditions for data on an industry's product prices, quantities, and input prices to identify retailers' and manufacturers' vertical supply model. Identification requires nonlinear demand for homogeneous products and multi-product firms with non-constant markups for...

This paper characterises the impact of vertical integration on price equilibria and incentives to strategically withhold capacity in a wholesale electricity auction. A two-stage game is analysed where vertically integrated firms first declare the quantity of electricity available and then...