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Nguyen, Tri - 2020

This paper introduces the PSCORE, which aggregates nine personal characteristics of chief executive officers (CEOs), to signal the quality of earnings. The PSCORE is a composite score based on publicly available data on CEOs. The study reports strong positive relationships between the PSCORE and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854865

Real Earnings Management Around CEO Turnovers

Geertsema, Paul - 2020

Following CEO turnovers, US firms adjust real business activities to manage earnings downward (REM bath). This effect is most pronounced in firms with low levels of institutional ownership. REM baths early in CEOs' tenure can be confounded with legitimate adjustments to business activities....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012855845

Do Shareholders Assess Managers’ Use of Accruals to Manage Earnings as a Negative Signal of Trustworthiness Even When its Outcome Serves Shareholders’ Interests?

Hewitt, Max - 2020

We examine how shareholders' trust in managers is affected by (1) the outcome of earnings management (inconsistent vs … controlled experiment, we predict and find that trust is impaired when the outcome of earnings management suggests that managers … have put their interests above shareholders' interests and/or when the method of earnings management suggests that managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857076

CEO Inside Debt and Accounting Conservatism

Wang, Cong - 2020

We examine the relation between accounting conservatism and inside debt held by managers in the form of pension …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857506

Executive Compensation, Earnings Management and Shareholder Litigation

Wu, Yan Wendy - 2020

This paper examines the effects of executive compensation and potential for earnings management on the incidence of shareholder class action lawsuits and their outcomes. Although damage measurement factors,managerial option intensity, and earnings management all significantly affect the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857511

Abnormal Audit Fees and Audit Quality : The Importance of Considering Managerial Incentives in Tests of Earnings Management

Eshleman, John Daniel - 2014

Are high audit fees a signal that the auditor exerted more effort or a signal that the auditor may be losing her independence? Prior literature offers conflicting evidence. In this paper, we re-examine the issue on a sample of clients who have both the incentive and the ability to use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013058925

The Strategic Engagement of Narcissistic CEOs in Earnings Management

Buchholz, Frerich - 2014

In corporate governance literature, the focus often lies on ex-post mechanisms like the composition of the board of directors or ownership structure and their impact on restricting earnings manipulation (García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009). In addition to that a recent string of literature...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013044433

Accounting Conservatism and Income Smoothing after the Japanese Sarbanes–Oxley Act

Eddie, Ian - 2018

demonstrates a decrease in income smoothing following J-SOX. The evidence suggests that J-SOX may have altered managers' accounting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917998

Does Managerial Risk Aversion Affect Earnings Management? Evidence from CEO Political Ideology

Deng, Mingcherng - 2018

We investigate whether managerial risk aversion, as measured by CEO political ideology, affects corporate decisions to undertake earnings management. Using a sample of 10,799 firm-year observations for S&P 1500 firms during the period from 1996 to 2008, we document that Republican CEOs, who tend...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919341

Curbing Earnings Management : Experimental Evidence on How Clawback Provisions and Board Monitoring Affect Managers’ Use of Discretion

Hales, Jeffrey - 2018

We examine how clawback provisions and board monitoring affect managers' use of discretion to achieve earnings targets … amount of earnings management activity. This null result arises because, while clawbacks do curb the extent to which managers … managers' use of discretion when making operational decisions (real earnings management). In contrast, strong board monitoring …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012923737