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Explicit collusion under antitrust enforcement

Mouraviev, Igor - 2013

the trigger price. Moreover, they tend to communicate more often as they become less patient, a cartel grows in size, or …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212526

Tacit Collusion of Partial Cross Ownership Under Cournot Competition

Gong, Zheng - 2019

Partial cross ownership (PCO) among firms affects their incentives to engage in tacit collusion. We analyze collusion behavior in an n-firm industry which allows asymmetric cross ownership, under Cournot competition. We find that in some ways increasing PCO hinders tacit collusion under the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896254

Cartel behavior and efficient sanctioning by criminal sentences

Wein, Thomas - 2020

multiplying cartel infringement by the reciprocal of the probability of detection and punishment. When we factor in expected … personal benefits. In theory, deterrence to participate in cartel activities must be based both on the incentives of firms as a … the cartel authority and civil law claims for damages. In addition to these risks, there is a recurring legal policy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253812

Anchoring, reference prices, and list price collusion

Paha, Johannes - 2019

The firms in this model set non-binding list prices before competing for buyers by non-cooperatively granting discounts. Each firm has an incentive to set a high list price if, for example, the customers anchor their willingness-to-pay on the list price. However, list price competition occurs if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012314193

Nationalization as credible threat against tacit collusion

Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca - 2014

Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. We characterise the properties of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011725688

Signaling and tacit collusion in an in finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Harrington, Joseph Emmett; Zhao, Wei - 2011 - August 2010, Revised May 2011

In the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners.Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players signal and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players - patient and impatient - and a player's type is private information. An impatient type is incapable of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009486361

Nationalization as Credible Threat Against Tacit Collusion

Delbono, Flavio - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013045206

Number Effects and Tacit Collusion in Experimental Oligopolies

Horstmann, Niklas - 2018

We systematically investigate the relationship between the number of firms in a market and tacit collusion by means of a meta-analysis of the literature on oligopoly experiments as well as two of our own experiments with a total of 368 participants. We show that the degree of tacit collusion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012937619

Partial collusion with asymmetric cross-price effects

Savorelli, Luca - 2010

Asymmetries in cross-price elasticities have been demonstrated by several empirical studies. In this paper we study from a theoretical stance how introducing asymmetry in the substitution effects influences the sustainability of collusion. We characterize the equilibrium of a linear Cournot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737876

R&D-Hindering Collusion

Bacchiega, Emanuele; Lambertini, Luca; Mantovani, Andrea - 2008

In an extended version of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) R&D competition model we find a region where the game is a prisoner's dilemma: firms still invest in R&D but they would obtain a higher profit by not investing at all. In a repeated version of the game, we prove that firms implicitly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212777