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's effort is unobservable to the firm), we show that the optimal contract has an extreme convex form in which a bonus is … unobservable to the salesperson), we show that the optimal contract is smoother as it involves positive compensation for … hurt the agent; in fact, under certain conditions, the contract is concave in sales. We also determine conditions under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900838
factor of the principal is her private information. I find that, in the separating contract, information revelation is always … the optimal separating contract. I find that, in the optimal contract of the "good" type, the bonus payment for high …, I show that the optimal separating contract generates higher surplus than the optimal pooling contract regardless of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905008
cost. The robust contract generates a seemingly excessive pay-performance sensitivity. The worst-case effort cost is high … contract is misspecified, i.e., when he is offered the robust contract, but his true effort cost is constant. I find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905754
trades off the instantaneous audit cost versus the drift of the cash flow process. The contract is implemented in standard …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891116
Principals seek to trade with agents by posting incentive contracts in a search environment. A contract solves the ex …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891117
maximizing contracts in dynamic principal-agent models. The FO-approach works when the resulting FO-optimal contract satisfies a …-optimal contract if the frequency of interactions is sufficiently high (or equivalently if the discount factor, time horizon and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158852
uncertain about which contract will be implemented, can increase the payoff of the high type principal to approximate her full …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932065
I show that deterministic dynamic contracts between a principal and an agent are always at least as profitable to the principal as stochastic ones, if the so-called first-order approach in dynamic mechanism design is satisfied. The principal commits, while the agent's type evolution follows a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011901976
seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation, and the buyer evaluates each contract according to its worst-case performance … over a set of probability distributions. This paper demonstrates that the contract that maximizes the minimum payoff over … contract for any given probability distribution is a posted price, which induces bunching. Using the e-contamination model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855861
contract is collateralized when in some state, some portion of the borrower's net worth is forfeited to the lender. We show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011919030