We analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show that a Nash game results in too much government spending and excessively high interest rates,...

We analyse optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a New-Keynesian model with public debt and inflation persistence. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) have shown that optimal discretionary policy is subject to a ''debt stabilization bias'' which requires debt to be returned to its pre-shock level. This...

We analyse optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a New-Keynesian model with public debt and inflation persistence. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) have shown that optimal discretionary policy is subject to a 'debt stabilization bias' which requires debt to be returned to its pre-shock level. This...

This paper studies the interactions of fiscal policy and monetary policy when they stabilize a single economy against shocks in a dynamic setting. If both policy-makers are benevolent, then, in our model, the best outcome is achieved when monetary policy does nearly all of the stabilization. If...